Jun
30
An Appropriate U.S. Response to Iran
“The truth is that Iran and the United States are now engaged in a great chess match. But the stakes are not those of intellectual gymnastics. The game is no game, for it involves the lives, and possible deaths, of thousands.” — Victor Davis Hanson, noted author/historian/professor
Trump and Khamenei
For the past couple days, the biggest Trump news has been about his visit with Kim Jong Un in North Korea. That’s YUGE! But, over the preceding several days, the main story — well, regarding foreign policy, anyway — was about the President’s response to Iran shooting down a U.S. surveillance drone on June 19. Many (mostly Trump’s critics) couldn’t decide whether Trump was a warmonger for authorizing the retaliatory strike or a wuss/appeaser for calling it off at the last minute. The President’s supporters, on the other hand, chose to view it as a strong leader offering a “final gesture of patience”.
Of course, the downed drone was only the latest Iranian provocation in recent weeks, which have included attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman and against Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline. While denying their involvement in the attacks, Tehran has meanwhile issued warnings and threats, e.g., that the U.S. “cannot expect to stay safe” after waging an “economic war” against Iran. This “economic war” refers, of course, to the sanctions imposed under the Administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign, which have cut deeply into Iran’s oil exports among other things.
On May 8, 2019, the first anniversary of the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal (which evidence suggest Iran had already violated), Tehran gave Britain, France, Germany, and the EU a July 7 deadline to “find a way to protect Iran from U.S. oil and bank sanctions”. If they don’t, Iran will “stop complying with parts of the agreement” and “exceed limits on enriched uranium and heavy-water stockpiles”. On June 17, a spokesman for Iran’s atomic energy agency claimed that they were “on course to exceed the limits on its uranium stock-pile by June 27.” If true, since I write this on June 30, Tehran has already stopped complying several days before the deadline has been reached.
As per the Heritage Foundation’s James Phillips,
“Iran’s beleaguered regime is signaling that if it cannot export its oil due to U.S. sanctions, Iran’s Arab neighbors also will be denied the opportunity to export their oil, with damaging consequences for oil-importing countries and the global economy….
Those asymmetric tactics are the opening skirmish in what is likely to be a protracted and intensifying crisis over Iran’s escalating uranium enrichment.”
To be clear, as annoying as the attacks so far have been, they are mostly symbolic and resulted in no loss of life. In the big picture, it is Iran’s nuclear program that is the larger, long-term threat.
Victor Davis Hanson makes the point that we are in a very different position than we were in previous showdowns with Iran. We have no one in-country — troops, ambassadors, civilians — that are in danger of being killed or ransomed and no investments of financial or psychological capital. We are also far less dependent on Middle Eastern oil than we once were (thanks to the Trump administration). Like us, our longtime ally — and constant target of Iran and its friends — Israel is militarily strong and self-sufficient in oil and gas. In short, Iran has a lot more to lose from a heated confrontation with us, and their imploding economy is already feeling it.
This all puts the U.S. in a much stronger negotiating position. However, our other allies in Asia and Europe are vulnerable, due to their dependence upon Middle Eastern oil and gas. And the oil-exporting Arab states certainly don’t want to jeopardize their economies by losing either customers or product. What does Iran hope to gain by its actions? According to Phillips,
James Phillips
“Iran seeks to drive a deep wedge in the international coalition that pressured it to reach the 2015 nuclear agreement and forestall a renewed international pressure campaign by provoking a crisis with the U.S. in which it will pose as a victim of U.S. ‘bullying.'”
Hanson seems to think Iran is aiming for a rather aggressive response to that “crisis”.
“Iran’s only hope is to draw the Trump administration into a messy Iraq-like ground war, or, at worst, a Balkans-style, months-long bombing campaign — with plenty of CNN footage of civilian collateral damage.”
So,… how should we proceed? Here are the main points, as gleaned from a combination of Hanson and Phillips’ assessments:
o Sanctions work and have not only hurt Iran’s economy in general but forced cutbacks in military spending and support for proxies (like Hamas). They have also “fueled domestic opposition to its costly intervention in Syria.”
o Regarding the more immediate issue of Iranian attacks on the Arab oil supply, we need to form “a broad coalition [of oil-importing states] to protect shipping that will make the issue one of ‘Iran against the world,’ rather than just ‘Iran against the U.S.'”. However, despite the dependence of the Chinese, Japanese, and European economies on Middle Eastern oil, they seem more afraid of negative repercussions than they are eager to help the U.S. deal with them.
o More broadly, “Washington needs to mobilize the strongest possible international support to effectively deal with Iran’s naval, nuclear, and terrorist threats.” Also, “[t]he best way to deter further Iranian aggression and avoid a possible war is to enlist European, Asian, and Arab allies to join a U.S.-led diplomatic campaign to persuade Tehran that the only way to lift sanctions is through negotiations to resolve the nuclear issue.” Again, easier said than done.
o Military action may provoke nationalism among the Iranian people that would counteract the declining appeal of its harsh Islamist ideology. Better for us to patiently build the case for any further economic and/or military response and “to make clear to Iranians that the regime provoked the crisis as part of its desperate efforts to cling to power.”
o We must have a strong military presence in the region, in order to give both our warnings and promises teeth. We have to be seen as a credible threat. Yet, practice restraint absent any “direct attacks on U.S. troops, citizens, or officials, or unless Tehran significantly escalates its attacks on international shipping.”
o Always be open to sincere diplomacy and negotiation with Iran’s leadership. Trump has said he is open to it, which is a reminder to the Iranian people that it is their own leaders who are the problem. Maybe one day, either this regime or the next will finally agree to a reasonable treaty — and stick to it.
Bottom line: Practice patience, self-control, international leadership, and stick to what we know works. Or, as Hanson concluded in his piece:
“How, then, can the United States deter Iranian escalation without getting into an unpopular war before the heated 2020 election? It merely needs to persist in the present standoff: ramp up the sanctions even tighter and ignore pathetic Iranian attacks on foreign ships.
If Tehran preemptively attacks an American ship or plane, it will be met by a disproportionate response, preferably one aimed not at civilian infrastructure but at the Iranian military hierarchy, the Revolutionary Guard, and the theocratic elite.
Otherwise, the Trump administration can sit back and monitor Iran’s international ostracism and economic isolation while remaining unpredictable and enigmatic, ready to hit back hard at any attack on Americans but without being suckered into an optional war with Iran in the perennial Middle East quagmire.”
The only thing that concerns me re Hanson and Phillips’ recommendations is that very little was said specifically about China or (especially) Russia’s potential backing of or assistance to Iran. I’m unclear what their current stances are toward Tehran, but they could pose significant problems.
